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ABSTRACT 
The net neutrality debate has brought out economic rationale for and against a variety of 
proposals of the broadband service providers to differentiate between different classes of users. 
Broadband users are characterized by the differing amounts of content they request online, as 
well as their valuation for such content. A broadband service provider (BSP) has two potential 
instruments for user discrimination – price discrimination and traffic prioritization (or 
degradation). We model six different pricing and prioritization options that cover many of the 
strategies that actual BSPs have adopted in the marketplace. By comparing these options, we find 
that imposing net neutrality increases the BSP‟s profit if the BSP price discriminates different 
consumer groups. If net neutrality is not imposed, however, the BSP might still prefer a net 
neutrality outcome depending on the various parameter values. These and other results will be 
useful both for the broadband service providers as they mull over the introduction of the different 
pricing strategies and for policymakers who are dealing with the net neutrality issue. 
Keywords:  Net neutrality, Internet access pricing, congestion pricing, traffic prioritization, public 
policy, market regulation 
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Broadband User Discrimination and the Net Neutrality Debate 
1. Introduction 
In 2007, it was independently verified that the broadband Internet service provider2 
Comcast was slowing down network traffic within its servers that originated from the popular 
peer-to-peer (P2P) networks (McCullagh 2007). After initially denying any such behavior, 
Comcast defended its actions by claiming that the traffic from the P2P networks, which was 
dominated by just a small fraction of the total number of users, was slowing down the 
network traffic for the rest of the users. The United States Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) later declared Comcast‟s actions to be illegal, thus providing further fuel 
to the „net neutrality‟ debate that is currently making the rounds in the US Congress and 
Senate. 
The issue of net neutrality received widespread media attention when some broadband 
service providers like Verizon, Comcast and AT&T (among others) proposed to charge popular 
online websites for priority delivery of the latter‟s content to their residential and commercial 
customers (Helm 2006; Waldmeir 2006). The proposal encountered stiff resistance from those 
who were supposed to be charged, and thus erstwhile competitors like Google, Yahoo! and 
Microsoft were soon lobbying before the United States Congress to pass legislation that would 
prevent the broadband service providers from carrying out their proposed plan (WSJ 2006), and 
thereby maintain what was termed the „neutrality‟ of the Internet (the term „net neutrality‟ itself is 
attributed to the Columbia Law School professor Tim Wu). This would involve the designing of 
“rules that prevent network operators and ISPs from using their power over the transmission 
                                                 
2
 Here, and in the rest of the article, we have uses the terms broadband internet service provider, broadband 
service provider (or BSP for short) and internet service provider (ISP) interchangeably. 
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technology to negatively affect competition in complementary markets for applications, content 
and portals” (van Schewick 2007). 
The supporters of net neutrality believe that a “maximally useful public information 
network aspires to treat all content, sites, and platforms equally” (Wu 2003), and while a formal 
definition of the operationalization of the principle does not exist, Hahn and Wallsten (2006) 
point out that it “usually means that broadband service providers charge consumers only once for 
Internet access, do not favor one content provider over another, and do not charge content 
providers for sending information over broadband lines to end users.” 
Lobbied intensely by both sides of the issue, the United States Congress is currently 
considering proposals to introduce net neutrality legislation (Dunbar 2006; McCullagh and 
Broache 2006; Windhausen 2006). The U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate have held 
several hearings on the subject (Representatives 2005; Senate 2006). The Federal Trade 
Commission has also chimed in, and has recently published a report that has advised a wait-and-
watch approach on the matter (FTC 2007). 
As is to be expected in a debate which has implications in many different areas, 
academicians too can be found on both sides of the debate (for a recent example of such debate, 
see (van Schewick and Farber 2009)). From a technical standpoint, the issue is as follows: the 
original design philosophy of the Internet communication protocols abide by the principle that 
every data packet is treated equally, so that no data packet gets priority over another (leading to 
the coinage of the term net neutrality – i.e., the net is neutral in its handling of any data packet 
that passes through it). From a broadband service provider‟s perspective, however, priority 
delivery of packets for a fee makes perfect economic sense, if there happen to be interested 
parties who would pay for the service. So far, the growing literature that has analyzed these 
economic issues of net neutrality (see for example (Economides and Tag 2007; Hermalin and 
Katz 2007; Bandyopadhyay et al. 2009; Cheng et al. 2009; Guo et al. 2009)) has modeled that 
interested party as the content providers who are jockeying for a position in the consumers‟ 
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minds. However, as the aforementioned Comcast example shows, the interested party might well 
be some of the consumers themselves who are willing to pay a fee to have their requested packets 
delivered with priority. In other words, a data packet traveling from its origin to its destination 
can be made “non-neutral” by the BSP at various stages of its journey – either at the „supply‟ 
side, whereby the BSP charges content providers for preferential delivery of their packets, or on 
the „demand‟ side, whereby the BSP charges the individual consumers a fee for the priority 
delivery of their requested content (or equivalently, de-prioritizes the requested content in the 
absence of the fee). Figure 1 shows a schematic of the different aspects of the net neutrality 
debate that we just described. It clearly brings out the role of the BSP as the gatekeeper who can 
charge either the content providers (at the left of the figure) or the consumers (at the right of the 
figure) for preferential delivery of requested content. 
--Insert Figure 1 about here-- 
In this article, our focus is on the latter aspect of net neutrality, whereby we analyze the 
economic rationale for and against the proposals put forth by several broadband service providers 
who intend to differentiate between different classes of users. For example, the cable broadband 
service provider Time Warner Cable has recently started an experiment in certain markets where 
they plan to charge Internet customers based on how much Web data they consume. The 
experiment started in a single market (Beaumont, TX) in the summer of 2008, and the company 
plans to introduce tiered pricing in several other markets in the near future. By charging a 
premium to the heaviest broadband users, much the same way cell phone providers collect fees 
from subscribers who exceed their allotted minutes, Time Warner would upend a longstanding 
uniform pricing strategy among (fixed-line) Internet service providers in the United States, 
whereby phone and cable companies have charged flat fees for unlimited access to the Web. 
AT&T has started a similar experiment with its own customers, also in Beaumont, TX. 
As expected, such experiments have reignited the net neutrality debate. Proponents of net 
neutrality – consumer advocates and online content providers, for example – have opined that that 
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a tiered Web-use pricing would limit customer choice and could stifle innovation by crimping 
demand for high-bandwidth services such as online video and music (Al-Chalabi 2008). 
However, cable and phone companies have countered by saying that they need the flexibility in 
setting prices for use of large, expensive, heavily used broadband networks, so as to effectively 
serve the majority of their customers and encourage greater efficiency in the way customers use 
capacity (Tweney 2008). 
As consumers spend more time online, and also use the Internet to consume various types 
of data-intensive content (like music and video – a high-definition movie typically consumes 
around 8 GB of traffic), the decision to charge data consumption by volume can be expected to 
have profound implications in the way online content is consumed in future. In such scenarios, 
heavy users can expect to spend much more than what they currently spend on the erstwhile “all 
you can eat” plans. However, Time Warner has countered that most people are actually not 
downloading that much data. The company's trial in Beaumont, TX, lasted several months: of the 
10,000 broadband customers enrolled – which represented about 25% of the company's total 
number of consumers in Beaumont – about 14% exceeded their cap and had to pay additional fees 
that averaged about $19 a month. Time Warner Cable also discovered that the top 25% of users 
consumed 100 times more data than the bottom 25% of users, suggesting an enormous gap in 
usage patterns. 
Broadband service providers have often mentioned that as more and more people 
download TV shows and movies, particularly those in high-definition, the broadband network 
infrastructure faces enormous strain. Time Warner Cable has said its strategy is intended to 
alleviate some of that strain, with users self-regulating themselves under the new plan. But critics 
have expressed concerns that the pricing scheme will discourage broadband use and impede new 
online media businesses before they even have a chance to flourish. 
The entire debate has raised a number of unanswered questions that are of interest to 
researchers and practitioners alike, not to mention the regulatory agencies. While legal scholars 
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might debate whether such pricing plans (as those that Time Warner and AT&T are 
experimenting with) or prioritization strategies (as Comcast briefly attempted) are fair on the 
consumers, it is an entirely separate issue whether there are economic incentives for the BSPs to 
pursue such strategies that go against the net neutrality principle. In other words, facing a highly 
dynamic and differentiated data usage patterns from different classes of users, would a BSP gain 
(as compared to the status quo) by employing different pricing and/or packet prioritization 
strategies? In the first part of our analysis, we explore this issue. 
While the BSP might prefer not to adhere to the principles of net neutrality under certain 
circumstances, such a move might be detrimental to the consumers or the society as a whole. 
Thus, from a social planner‟s perspective, the issue is somewhat different: would the abolishment 
of net neutrality on the „demand‟ side result in lower consumer surplus or social welfare? 
Depending on that answer, the social planner might wish to regulate on the issue. 
In this paper, we explore these issues and model them in an analytical framework and 
examine the economic impacts of user discrimination and net neutrality from the perspectives of 
both the BSP and the social planner. We characterize the dynamic and differentiated data demand 
of the end consumers by their valuations for data consumption and their usage patterns. 
Specifically, we consider a stylized model that segments the consumers into two types, H (for 
heavy) and L (light), with the H-type consumers constituting a (relatively small) fraction of the 
entire consumer base (for example, as we point out later, AT&T characterized their heavy users 
constituting about 5% of the total consumer base). These two types of consumers are 
characterized by their valuations for data consumption ( HV  and LV  where H LV V ) and their 
usage patterns ( H  and L  where H L  ). We will discuss these user characteristics in greater 
detail in next section. Under the current scenario (which can be thought of as the net neutrality 
model with a uniform fixed fee pricing strategy), all users are charged the same fixed price for 
accessing broadband content. Both types of users face similar delays while accessing their desired 
 8 
content – the delay arises from the fact that the users‟ packets are serviced by the broadband 
service provider who has a fixed capacity. Facing this heterogeneous user data demand, 
broadband service providers have two potential instruments for user discrimination – price 
discrimination and traffic prioritization. If the BSP is allowed to differentially charge its users 
and/or prioritize their requested content, we explore six different strategies that it might employ: 
1. Broadband user traffic from different user types face the same delay, and all users are 
charged the same fixed fee (i.e., the status quo). 
2. Broadband user traffic from different user types face the same delay, and different types 
of users are charged different fixed fees. 
3. Broadband user traffic from different user types face the same delay, and different types 
of users are charged a two-part tariff. 
4. Broadband user traffic from different user types face different delays, and all users are 
charged the same fixed fee. 
5. Broadband user traffic from different user types face different delays, and different types 
of users are charged different fixed fees. 
6. Broadband user traffic from different user types face different delays, and different types 
of users are charged a two-part tariff. 
The first three options (where all the broadband users face the same delay for their 
packets) cover different pricing strategies under net neutrality (or NN for short), while the last 
three options cover the different pricing strategies under no net neutrality (NNN). Another way to 
look at these options would be to think of the first three as representing the strategies that the BSP 
can adopt if it is allowed to use only price discrimination, while the last three would represent 
strategies where the BSP is allowed to use both price and traffic prioritization as discriminating 
tools. These six different options help us model a broad swath of strategies that a BSP might 
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employ under and in the absence of net neutrality. Depending on the characteristics of users‟ 
valuations for content and their usage patterns, different types of pricing and traffic prioritization 
regimes yield different profits for the BSP. However the optimal choice for the BSP might not 
coincide with that of a policymaker who intends to maximize the total social surplus. The results 
of the analysis should therefore be useful both for the broadband service providers as they mull 
over the introduction of the different pricing/prioritization strategies in an age where consumers 
increasingly get their information and entertainment online, and for policymakers who might 
wish to regulate the BSPs‟ practice of user discrimination in order to maximize social surplus. 
We find that with net neutrality in place, the BSP would prefer to charge a two-part tariff 
for Internet access, but without net neutrality, a BSP may choose to charge a uniform price and 
degrade heavy users or else charge a higher price to high type users for preferential delivery of 
their data packets, depending on the characteristics of users‟ valuations for content and their 
usage patterns. Without net neutrality in place, we find that degrading the experience of the heavy 
users increases social welfare. Finally, we also identify conditions under which the BSP‟s user 
discrimination choice deviate from the social optimum. The last result helps establish the criteria 
under which the social planner might wish to regulate the BSP‟s actions in order to maximize the 
social surplus. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In next section, we propose a stylized 
model of the BSP‟s pricing mechanisms in the context of net neutrality. We then analyze the 
BSP‟s pricing options under net neutrality (Section 3), followed by a similar analysis of the 
BSP‟s pricing options in the absence of net neutrality (Section 4). This enables us to compare the 
different alternatives and examine the joint impact of pricing and traffic prioritization 
mechanisms from the perspectives of the BSP (Section 5) and the social planner (Section 6) 
respectively. Section 7 concludes with a summary of our findings and some directions for future 
research. 
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2. The Model 
We assume a monopolist BSP who provides Internet access to the end consumers. While the 
monopoly assumption is a simplification in some geographies, it is to be noted that unlike many 
other countries, the extent of competition in the local broadband services market is very limited in 
the United States, so much so that in many places, a single broadband service provider is often a 
de facto monopolist (Hausman et al. 2001; Economides 2008). Some of the factors leading to this 
scenario are the high switching costs induced by long-term service contracts and by incompatible 
broadband technologies between cable and phone companies. Further, many customers are not 
qualified for DSL broadband services from phone companies because they exceed the maximal 
distance limit from the phone company‟s nearest switching office, making the cable operators the 
only feasible broadband service providers in several local markets (Turner 2007). Thus, in 
addition to providing the benefit of making the analysis tractable, the assumption closely reflects 
the reality of local broadband services in the U.S. market. 
To model the demand for broadband Internet access service, we consider a unit mass of 
end consumers. As mentioned earlier, we assume that there are two types of users: a fraction   
of H-type consumers and 1  fraction of L-type consumers. High-type users request more 
content (the requested rate of data packets by the two user types are given by H  and L  
respectively, where H L  ) and have higher valuation for that content ( H LV V ) than the Low-
type users. Considering the consumers‟ heterogeneous demand patterns, the BSP may charge a 
uniform fixed fee ( F ) per unit time to all consumers; different fixed fees ( HF  and LF ) per unit 
time to different types of consumers; or a usage-based fee ( p ) per packet to consumers for 
Internet access, a pricing strategy that has been already employed in some Scandinavian countries 
(Economist 2003; Bandyopadhyay and Cheng 2006). Since the consumers are serviced by the 
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BSP which has a fixed network infrastructure capacity, the former encounter a disutility while 
they wait for the packets to arrive. The consumers‟ utility function thus takes the following form: 
 
, if the BSP charges a uniform fixed fee
, if the BSP charges differential fixed fee
, if the BSP charges two-part tariff
i i
i i i i
i i i
V w F
u V w F
V w F p
 
  
  
 (1) 
where  or i H L  and iw  is the delay cost for type i  consumers. 
Consumers request data from various websites and the requested data packets are 
transmitted through the BSP‟s network. We model the congestion in the network after 
(Mendelson 1985; Bandyopadhyay and Cheng 2006), and accordingly, consumers‟ request for 
data packets follows a Poisson process with arrival rate 
H  and L  for H-type and L-type 
consumers respectively. The gross valuations the two types of consumers receive are denoted by 
HV  and LV . Consumers face a delay cost due to network congestion during the data transmission 
process. The BSP‟s capacity is fixed and denoted by  . As noted in the afore-mentioned 
literature, we assume an M/M/1 queue to model the data transmission service provided by the 
BSP under net neutrality. Then the time that a data packet spent in the system is 
1
 
 (when net 
neutrality is enforced, i.e., when no packet has priority over another) and the corresponding delay 
cost is 
d
 
 where d  is the delay parameter that captures the unit cost of delay for consumers 
waiting for the content to arrive from the websites. We summarize all the notations in Table 1. 
--Insert Table 1 about here-- 
The delay cost for the consumers under net neutrality is: 
 
 
,   or 
1
i
H L
d
w i H L
   
 
  
 (2) 
In the absence of net neutrality, the BSP may prioritize data traffic based on user types. In 
this context, we note that the technology to discriminate packets and streamline Internet traffic 
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has been available at minimal cost, and we therefore assume that there is no additional expense 
incurred by the BSP to implement a mechanism that enables preferential delivery of content 
(Cheng et al. 2009). We use a two-class priority queue to model the BSP‟s data transmission 
service. If both H-type and L-type consumers receive the same priority for their traffic, then the 
congestion cost and the corresponding utility function would remain the same as in equation (2). 
However, if H-type consumers receive higher priority while L-type consumers receive lower 
priority, then the delay costs for the two types are as follows: 
 
   
,  
1
H L
H H H L
d d
w w

       
 
      
 (3) 
On the other hand, if L-type consumers receive higher priority while H-type consumers receive 
lower priority, then the delay costs for the two types are given by the following expressions: 
 
     
,  
11 1
H L
LL H L
d d
w w

        
 
           
 (4) 
In terms of pricing, the BSP may charge a uniform fixed fee to all consumers or charge 
different fixed fees to different types of consumers for Internet access. The potential regulation of 
net neutrality limits the BSP from selectively prioritizing the Internet traffic. In the absence of net 
neutrality, the BSP can also discriminate against different types of consumers through traffic 
prioritization. In the next two sections, we model these scenarios. 
3. Net Neutrality 
In this section, we analyze three potential pricing structures for the BSP under net neutrality – 
uniform fixed fee, differential fixed fees and charging a two-part tariff. 
Option NN1: Uniform fixed fee under net neutrality 
Under net neutrality all consumers receive the same priority and therefore face the same 
congestion for data transmission. The most simple and common pricing mechanism for the BSP 
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is to charge a uniform fixed fee for all consumers. The BSP‟s profit maximization problem is 
formulated as follows: 
  
 
 
 
NN1
NN1 NN1
NN1
NN1
max
s.t. 0
1
0
1
F
H
H L
L
H L
F
d
V F i
d
V F ii

   
   

  
  
  
  
 (5) 
Constraint (i) is the participation constraint for H-type consumers and constraint (ii) is the 
participation constraint for L-type consumers. Since H LV V , the BSP will charge a fixed access 
fee that is high enough to just keep the L-type consumers to participate, i.e., 
 
*
NN1
1
L
H L
d
F V
   
 
  
, and the BSP then receives a corresponding profit of 
 
* *
NN1 NN1
1
L
H L
d
F V
   
  
  
. 
The corresponding consumer surplus, defined as the sum of the utility of all consumers, is given 
by 
 
 
 NN1 NN1 NN1
CS 1
1 1
H L
H L H L
d d
V F V F 
       
   
                    
 
 H LV V  , and the social welfare, defined as the sum of both the BSP‟s profit and consumer 
surplus, is  
 
*
NN1 NN1 NN1SW CS 1
1
H L
H L
d
V V  
   
     
  
. 
Option NN2: Differential fixed fees under net neutrality 
It is easy to see that this option reduces to the option NN1 above. This is because the BSP has just 
one service offering at its disposal, and therefore will not be able to differentiate between the two 
classes of users by using different prices (if the two user types are offered two different price 
 14 
points, the H-type users will always choose the lower price, as would the L-type users). The 
formal statement of the BSP‟s profit maximization problem is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
NN2_H NN2_L
NN2 NN2_H NN2_L
,
NN2_H
NN2_L
NN2_H NN2_L
NN2_L NN2_H
max 1
s.t. 0
1
0
1
1 1
1 1
F F
H
H L
L
H L
H H
H L H L
L L
H L H L
F F
d
V F i
d
V F ii
d d
V F V F iii
d d
V F V F iv
  
   
   
       
       
  
  
  
  
  
    
     
    
     
 (6) 
Constraints (i) and (ii) are participation constraints for H-type and L-type consumers respectively. 
Constraints (iii) and (iv) are incentive compatibility constraints for H-type and L-type consumers 
respectively. Constraint (iii) can be reduced to NN2_H NN2_LF F  and Constraint (iv) can be 
reduced to NN2_H NN2_LF F . So NN2_H NN2_LF F . As a result, under net neutrality Option NN2 
can be reduced to Option NN1 with 
 
* * *
NN2 NN2_H NN2_L
1
L
H L
d
F F V
   
   
  
. 
The corresponding consumer surplus will still be  NN2CS H LV V  , and the social welfare 
will be given by  
 NN2
SW 1
1
H L
H L
d
V V 
   
   
  
. 
Option NN3: Two-part tariff under net neutrality 
Under this option, the BSP charges a two-part tariff for Internet access – a lump-sum fee F  and a 
per-unit charge p . Under net neutrality, the BSP cannot prioritize any user‟s requested content. 
The BSP‟s profit maximization problem is: 
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 
 
 
 
 
NN3 NN3
NN3 NN3 NN3
,
NN3 NN3
NN3 NN3
max 1
s.t. 0
1
0
1
H L
F p
H H
H L
L L
H L
F p
d
V F p i
d
V F p ii
   

   

   
     
   
  
   
  
 (7) 
Constraint (i) is the participation constraint for H-type consumers and constraint (ii) is the 
participation constraint for L-type consumers. By solving the BSP‟s problem (see Appendix A for 
derivation details), we find when the two types of consumers‟ valuations for data consumption 
are comparable (we denote this as Case NN3_1, with the exact criterion being 
 
 1
H LH L
H
L L H L
dV
V
 
     

 
    
), the BSP will charge a positive lump-sum fee 
 
*
NN3_1
1
H L L H
H L H L
V V d
F
 
     

 
   
 and a positive usage-based fee 
*
NN3_1
H L
H L
V V
p
 



; however, if the two types of consumers differ significantly in their valuations 
for their requested content (or more precisely, if 
 
 1
H LH L
H
L L H L
dV
V
 
     

 
    
, 
which we denote as Case NN3_2), the BSP will charge a zero lump-sum fee and rely only on 
usage-based fee: 
*
NN3_2 0F   and 
 
*
NN3_2
1
1
L
L H L
d
p V
    
 
  
   
. The corresponding 
consumer surpluses are NN3_1CS 0  and 
 NN3_2
CS
1
H L H L L H
H L L L
V Vd    

     
        
       
         
. The resulting social 
welfare is  
 NN3_1 NN3_2
SW SW 1
1
H L
H L
d
V V 
   
    
  
. Note that under 
Case NN3_1, the entire consumer surplus is extracted away completely by the BSP. 
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4. No Net Neutrality (NNN) 
In this section, we consider the BSP‟s three pricing options (uniform fixed fee, differential fixed 
fees and two-part tariff) under NNN. In the absence of any net neutrality regulation, broadband 
service providers have one extra set of instruments to discriminate between end users: the BSP 
may assign different priorities to different types of traffic. Technically, BSPs first identify the 
data destination by inspecting data packets transmitted through the network. The BSPs then either 
charge the same access fee for both two types and downgrade data transmission for heavy users 
(H-type consumers in our model) or charge a higher access fee and then assign a higher priority 
for the data packets requested by H-type consumers. Just as we analyzed the pricing strategies 
under NN, we now look into the three analogous pricing regimes under NNN. 
Option NNN1: Uniform fixed fee under no net neutrality 
When the BSP charge a uniform price to both types of the consumers, it has the incentive to 
assign a lower priority to data packets from H-type users because of their heavy use of the shared 
bandwidth. The BSP‟s decision problem can be formulated as: 
    
 
 
 
NNN1
NNN1 NNN1
NNN1
NNN1
max
s.t. 0
1 1
0
1
F
H
L H L
L
L
F
d
V F i
d
V F ii


      
  

  
          
  
 
 (8) 
Constraint (i) is the participation constraint for H-type consumers (reflecting their higher wait 
times in the prioritized queue) and constraint (ii) is the participation constraint for L-type 
consumers. Notice that we assume 
   1 1H L H L
d
V

      

          
 to ensure that 
this scenario is feasible. Both constraints give upper bounds for the access fee NNN1F . We can 
derive the equilibrium by comparing the two upper bounds. 
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Case NNN1_1: If 
     1 1 1L HL L H L
d d
V V

         
  
            
, i.e., 
 
   
1
1 1
H L
H L
L H L
d
V V
  
      
    
          
, then 
 
* *
NNN1_1 NNN1_1
1
L
L
d
F V
  
  
 
. The corresponding consumer surplus is  
   
 
 
NNN1_1 NNN1_1
NNN1_1
CS
1 1
1
1
H
L H L
L
L
d
V F
d
V F


      

  
 
   
            
 
       
 
 
 
 
+ 1
1 1
H L
H L
L H L
d
V V
  

      
 
    
     
. 
The expression for social welfare is 
   
 
 
*
NNN1_1 NNN1_1 NNN1_1SW CS
1
11 1
H L
LL H L
d d
V V


 
        
 
   
                        
. 
Case NNN1_2: If 
 
   
1
1 1
H L
H L
L H L
d
V V
  
      
    
          
, then 
   
* *
NNN1_2 NNN1_2
1 1
H
L H L
d
F V


      
  
          
. 
The corresponding consumer surplus is  
   
 
 
NNN1_2 NNN1_2
NNN1_2
CS
1 1
1
1
H
L H L
L
L
d
V F
d
V F


      

  
 
   
            
 
       
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 
 
 
 
1
1
1 1
H L
H L
L H L
d
V V
  

      
   
      
      
, 
and the corresponding social welfare is given by the following expression: 
   
 
 
*
NNN1_2 NNN1_2 NNN1_2SW CS
1
11 1
H L
LL H L
d d
V V


 
        
 
   
                        
. 
 
Option NNN2: Differential fixed fees under no net neutrality 
Under this option, the BSP charges a higher price for higher quality of the data transmission 
service through the Internet. Specifically, the BSP would offer the Internet access service with 
congestion cost 
H
d
 
 at a fixed price NNN2_HF  to H-type consumers and the Internet access 
service with congestion cost 
   1H H L
d
          
 at a fixed price NNN2_LF  to L-
type consumers. The BSP‟s profit maximization problem is then as follows: 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
   
NNN2_H NNN2_L
NNN2 NNN2_H NNN2_L
,
NNN2_H
NNN2_L
NNN2_H NNN2_L
NNN2_L
max 1
s.t. 0
0
1
1
1
F F
H
H
L
H H L
H H
H H H L
L L
H H L
F F
d
V F i
d
V F ii
d d
V F V F iii
d d
V F V
  
 

     

       

      
  
  

  
     
    
      
   
     
 NNN2_H
H
F iv
(9) 
Constraint (i) is the participation constraint for H-type consumers and constraint (ii) is the 
participation constraint for L-type consumers. Notice that we assume 
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   1L H H L
d
V

     

     
 to ensure the feasibility of this outcome. Constraints 
(iii) and (iv) are incentive compatibility constraints for H-type and L-type consumers 
respectively. Constraint (iii) can be reduced to  
   NNN2_H NNN2_L 1 HH H L
d d
F F

      
  
     
. 
Constraint (iv) can be reduced to 
   NNN2_H NNN2_L 1 HH H L
d d
F F

      
  
     
. 
Therefore, 
   NNN2_H NNN2_L 1 HH H L
d d
F F

      
  
     
. 
From constraint (i), we get NNN2_H H
H
d
F V
 
 

. 
From constraint (ii), we get 
   NNN2_L 1L H H L
d
F V

     
 
     
. 
Since 
   1H LH H H L
d d
V V

       
    
     
          
 
   1 HH H L
d d
      
 
     
, 
*
NNN2_H L
H
d
F V
 
 

, 
   
*
NNN2_L
1
L
H H L
d
F V

     
 
     
, and 
 
 
 
2
* * *
NNN2 NNN2_H NNN2_L
1
1
1
H L
L
H H L
d
F F V
     
  
     
   
      
    
. 
The corresponding consumer surplus is  
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 
   
 
NNN2 NNN2_H
NNN2_L
CS
1
1
H
H
L H L
H H L
d
V F
d
V F V V

 

 
     
 
   
 
 
      
       
, and the social 
welfare is given by 
 
   
*
NNN2 NNN2 NNN2SW CS
1
1
H L
H H H L
d d
V V


 
       
 
  
                 
. 
 
Option NNN3: Two-part tariff under no net neutrality 
Under this scenario, the BSP charges the H-type consumers a two-part tariff to ensure a 
preferential delivery of their data packets, while the L-type consumers are charged only a lump-
sum fee for their data delivery (which involves a higher delay). The BSP‟s decision problem can 
be formulated as: 
 
   
 
   
 
   
NNN3 NNN3
NNN3 NNN3 H NNN3
,
NNN3 H NNN3
NNN3
NNN3 H NNN3 NNN3
NNN3
max
s.t. 0
0
1
1
1
F p
H
H
L
H H L
H H
H H H L
L L
HH H L
F p
d
V F p i
d
V F ii
d d
V F p V F iii
d d
V F V F
 

 

     


       

      
 
   

  
     
     
      
    
     
 NNN3 H NNN3p iv
 (10) 
Constraint (i) is the participation constraint for H-type consumers and constraint (ii) is the 
participation constraint for L-type consumers. Constraints (iii) and (iv) are incentive compatibility 
constraints for H-type and L-type consumers respectively. Constraint (iii) can be reduced to 
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   NNN3 H
1
1 HH H L
d d
p

       
  
  
       
 
Constraint (iv) can be reduced to 
   NNN3 H
1
1 HH H L
d d
p

       
  
  
       
. 
So 
   
*
NNN3
H H L
1
1 HH
d d
p

       
  
  
       
. 
Substituting back to constraint (i) gives 
   NNN3 1H H H L
d
F V

     
 
     
. 
Constraint (ii) implies 
   NNN3 1L H H L
d
F V

     
 
     
. 
So 
   
*
NNN3
1
L
H H L
d
F V

     
 
     
 and 
 
 
2
* * *
NNN3 NNN3 H NNN3
1
1
H L
L
H H L
d
F p V
     
 
     
   
     
    
. 
The corresponding consumer surplus is  
 
   
 
NNN3 NNN3 H NNN3
NNN3
CS
1
1
H
H
L H L
H H L
d
V F p
d
V F V V
 
 

 
     
 
    
 
 
      
       
. 
Therefore the social welfare is 
*
NNN3 NNN3 NNN3SW CS   
 
   
1
1
H L
H H H L
d d
V V

 
       
  
                 
. 
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Based on the BSP‟s pricing and traffic prioritization strategies, the BSP has six options and we 
summarize these six options in the Table 2. 
--Insert Table 2 about here-- 
In the previous two sections, we have analyzed the BSP‟s six options involving pricing and 
(under NNN) different priorities for different user classes. In the next section, we compare these 
different options, and thus explore the conditions under which the BSP might choose any one of 
them. 
5. The BSP’s Choices 
In this section we study the effects of pricing structure and traffic prioritization on the BSP‟s 
profit. 
The BSP’s preference for pricing structure under net neutrality (choice between three options 
NN1, NN2, NN3) 
Under net neutrality, the BSP is limited to just the pricing mechanisms to discriminate between 
the different user types. Comparing the BSP‟s three pricing options (NN1, NN2 and NN3) under 
net neutrality yields 
* * *
NN3_1 NN1 NN2     and 
* * *
NN3_2 NN1 NN2    . This result is summarized 
in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: (BSP‟s preferred pricing structure under net neutrality) 
Under net neutrality, the BSP prefers a two-part tariff. 
Proof: See Appendix B. 
The BSP’s preference for pricing structure under no net neutrality (choice between three 
options NNN1, NNN2, NNN3) 
In the absence of net neutrality, the BSP may either charge the same price to both types of 
consumers and set a lower priority to data packets from H-type consumers (NNN1), or charge a 
higher price and set a higher priority to H-type consumers (NNN2), or charge H-type consumers a 
usage-based fee to get a higher priority (NNN3). The first option yields profit levels 
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. The second and third option generates the 
same profit level for the BSP, i.e., 
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Comparing the three options, we find that if 
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then 
* * *
NNN1_1 NNN2 NNN3     i.e., when H-type consumers value their requested content more 
than the L-type consumers beyond a threshold, the BSP benefits from charging the same price to 
both types and assigning a lower priority to traffic from H-type consumers. If on the other hand 
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, then 
* * *
NNN1_2 NNN2 NNN3    ., i.e., when 
H-type consumers and L-type consumers have similar valuation for content, the BSP prefers to 
charge a higher price and in return offer preferential delivery to the data packets from the H-type 
consumers. This leads to our next proposition. 
Proposition 2: (BSP‟s preferred pricing structure under no net neutrality) 
(i) If 
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* * * *
NNN1 NNN1_2 NNN2 NNN3      ; 
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(iii) If 
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* * * *
NNN1 NNN1_2 NNN2 NNN3      . 
Proof: See Appendix C. 
The BSP’s overall preference for pricing structure (choice between the six options NN1, NN2, 
NN3, NNN1, NNN2, NNN3) 
In this subsection we address the question of what would be the equilibrium outcome if the BSP 
is given all six user discrimination options. Proposition 3 summarizes the comparison result of all 
six options. 
Proposition 3: (BSP‟s overall preferred pricing structure) 
There are two potential preferred pricing structures for the BSP: NN3 or NNN1, depending on the 
parameter values. 
Proof: See Appendix D. 
We illustrate these results by adopting some real-life parameter values. AT&T has 
recently estimated that their top 5% of users (in terms of usage) account for about 40% of the 
total traffic, i.e., 0.05   and 
 
0.4
1
H
H L

  

 
(Tweney 2008). Using these parameter 
values, Figure 2 depicts the BSP‟s overall preferred pricing/prioritization strategy for such a 
traffic pattern in the H LV V  space. The BSP prefers an NN3 outcome (two-part tariff with equal 
priority) in the shaded area and it prefers an NNN1 outcome (uniform fixed fee with low priority 
for heavy users) in the un-shaded area. The area marked by the bold lines represents the feasible 
parameter space. The different intercepts 0C , 1C , etc. on the two axes (the precise values of these 
intercepts have been defined at the beginning of the Appendices) and the straight lines emanating 
from them represent the different regions (marked by numbers 1 through 7) in the parameter 
space within which we have to consider the optimal regime choice for the BSP. 
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--Insert Figure 2 about here— 
A different traffic pattern would change the slope of the line that has the intercept of 
0C , but would not materially change the nature of the outcome – there would still be some 
regions where the BSP would opt for the NN3 outcome and the rest of the feasible region where 
the BSP would opt for the NNN1 outcome. 
6. The Social Planner’s Preference for Pricing Structure 
As outlined before, the choice of the social planner with regards to the pricing/prioritization 
regime might be at odds with that of the BSP, since social welfare is the sum of the BSP‟s profit 
and the consumers‟ surplus. Note that since the consumers‟ payments for the broadband services 
are effectively internal transfers as far as the calculation of the social welfare is concerned, the 
only measurable effect of the consumers on the social welfare comes from their valuation and the 
disutility that they attribute towards the congestion. 
The social planner’s preference for pricing structure under net neutrality (NN1, NN2, NN3) 
In this subsection, we examine the social planner‟s preference for different pricing structures 
under net neutrality by comparing the social welfare levels when the BSP adopts the three pricing 
structures. The following proposition summarizes the analysis. 
Proposition 4: (Social planner‟s preferred pricing structure under net neutrality) 
When net neutrality is in place, social welfare is the same for one-level fixed fee, two-level fixed 
fee, and two-part tariff, i.e., NN1 NN2 NN3SW SW =SW . This is expected, since the effect of 
pricing is internalized, and there are no other effects to consider, as traffic prioritization is not 
allowed under net neutrality. 
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The social planner’s preference for pricing structure under no net neutrality (NNN1, NNN2, 
NNN3) 
In this subsection, we examine the social planner‟s preference for different pricing structures 
under no net neutrality by comparing the social welfare levels when the BSP adopts the three 
pricing structures. Propositions 5 and 6 summarize the results. 
Proposition 5: (Social planner‟s preferred pricing structure under no net neutrality) 
Without net neutrality, the social planner always prefers the BSP charging a uniform fixed fee 
while downgrading heavy users, i.e., NNN1 NNN2 NNN3SW >SW SW . 
Proof: See Appendix E. 
The social planner’s overall preference for pricing structure (NN1, NN2, NN3, NNN1, NNN2, 
NNN3) 
Proposition 6: (Social planner‟s overall preferred pricing structure) 
NNN1 NN1 NN2 NN3 NNN2 NNN3SW >SW SW SW SW SW     
Proof: See Appendix F. 
 
Differences between the BSP’s and the social planner’s preferences 
Based on Proposition 1-6, we can see the BSP has incentive to deviate in its pricing choice from 
the social optimum. We summarize the differences in Proposition 7. 
Proposition 7: (The BSP‟s deviation from social optimum) 
The BSP‟s preference differs from the social planner‟s preference under two scenarios: 
(1) 
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; and 
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. 
Proof: See Appendix G. 
The above set of results is very interesting in the context of the net neutrality debate. As 
we mentioned in the introduction, all the extant literature that covers the economic aspects of the 
net neutrality debate have concentrated on the „supply‟ side of the equation (i.e., the issue 
whether the BSP should charge content providers for the priority delivery of their content), and 
the results in such analyses have shown that for almost all parameter values, the BSP would 
prefer an NNN outcome over an NN outcome, even though from a social planner‟s perspective, 
an NN outcome would be preferable (see for example (Cheng et al. 2009)). In such situations, it 
would often make sense for the social planner to regulate net neutrality on the „supply‟ side. 
When we however concentrate on the „demand‟ side of the net neutrality debate, we find that 
while there are once again scenarios under which the social planner would deviate from the 
BSP‟s choice, the deviation is towards an NNN outcome: the social planner would rather have the 
BSP choose to degrade the quality of the heavy users (and thereby opt for a no net neutrality 
outcome), but instead the BSP ends up choosing a two-part tariff that falls under the ambit of net 
neutrality. This represents a dilemma for the social planner: while he can decide between 
enforcing a net neutrality regime and not enforcing it, he however cannot enforce that the BSP 
chooses a NNN outcome when it is given the choice. 
The results also help illustrate the complexity of the net neutrality debate. While there is 
growing evidence that a net neutrality regime might be preferable when it comes to charging 
content providers, the results in this paper illustrate that there are conditions under which NNN 
might be the preferred outcome when it comes to charging consumers for preferential delivery of 
their requested packets. As some industry observers have recently commented, the same network 
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neutrality rules that ensure higher social welfare by prohibiting the BSP from charging online 
content providers might actually protect “bandwidth hogs” at the expense of Internet users with 
average usage patterns (McDougall 2008). 
While the discussion might not be that clear-cut as our stylized model might suggest (for 
example, some commentators have pointed to the fact that these “bandwidth hogs” often help 
promote innovation on the Internet – see for example (Al-Chalabi 2008)), but we do hope that our 
results help promote the richness of the discourse on a very important subject that might well 
determine how online content is accessed in the future. 
7. Conclusion 
The debate of net neutrality and the potential regulation of net neutrality may fundamentally 
change the dynamics of data consumption and transmission through the Internet. In contrast to the 
extant literature that has looked at the problem from the „supply‟ perspective, in this paper, we 
look at the issue from the „demand‟ perspective. We examine the economic impact of net 
neutrality on the BSP and the society as a whole, if the former is not allowed to either prioritize or 
degrade the delivery of content to one class of users. We consider scenarios with and without net 
neutrality and analyze the problem of the monopoly broadband service provider trying out 
different pricing and prioritization strategies. 
We find that the impact of net neutrality depends on both the characteristics of the 
Internet data consumption market and the BSP‟s pricing strategies. We find that with net 
neutrality in place, the BSP would prefer to charge a two-part tariff for Internet access, but 
without net neutrality, a BSP may choose to charge a uniform price and degrade heavy users or 
else charge a higher price to high type users for preferential delivery of their data packets 
depending on the characteristics of users‟ valuations for content and their usage patterns. 
Interestingly, we find that without net neutrality in place, degrading the experience of the heavy 
users increases social welfare, a practice that was recently banned by the FCC. The joint impact 
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of both pricing and net neutrality under the framework of our model has potentially very 
important policy implications. We identify conditions under which the BSP‟s user discrimination 
choices deviate from the social optimum. The last result helps illustrate the social planner‟s 
dilemma: even though he might decide not to enforce net neutrality, there will still be scenarios 
under which the BSP would opt for a net neutrality solution that would be socially sub-optimal. 
The involved nature of the problem and the surfeit of relevant parameters meant that we 
had to consider a stylized model in order to get analytical closure. In particular, we did not 
consider one issue that has been raised by some commentators – that of the possibility that a 
select few “power users” within a network have positive externalities that help other users and the 
BSP in the long run(Al-Chalabi 2008). While the veracity of such a claim can be debated, we 
think that future research can consider simulating the presence of such users within a network, 
and thus xamine the fallouts of their presence. 
 30 
Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: Schematic to show the two different aspects of the net neutrality debate. 
The heart of the net neutrality debate is at the local loop of the BSP. Here, the BSP 
can charge either the content providers or the end consumers in order to make a 
data packet ―non-neutral‖
Internet Backbone 
Content Providers 
End Consumers 
Broadband Service 
Provider at local loop 
H  
L  
Charge content 
providers 
Charge 
consumers 
L  
L  
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Notes: (a) The area marked by the bold lines represents the feasible parameter space ( H HV C , and 
L LV C , and H LV V  where HC  and LC  are defined in the appendix). (b) The BSP‟s preferred option is: 
NNN1_1 for region 1, NN3_2 for region 2, NN3_1 for region 3, NNN1_1 for region 4, NNN1_2 for region 
5, NN3_1 for region 6, and NN3_1 for region 7. (c) The shaded areas correspond to the regions where the 
BSP‟s preference is different from the social planner‟s preference. 
 
Figure 2: The BSP’s overall preference for pricing structure and how it differs from 
the social planner’s preference 
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Table 1: List of Notations 
Notation Description 
  Percentage of H-type consumers 
H , L  Rate of content requested from H-type and L-type consumers in packets per unit of 
time 
HV , LV  
The gross value function of retrieving content for H-type and L-type consumers 
respectively 
F  A uniform fixed fee per unit of time charged by the BSP to end consumers 
HF , LF  Fixed fees charged to H-type and L-type consumers respectively 
p  Unit price per packet for data packet transmission 
Hw , Lw  
Consumers‟ delay cost (congestion cost) for H-type and L-type consumers 
respectively 
  Capacity of the BSP in packets per unit of time 
d  Consumers‟ delay parameter that converts the delay for consumers waiting for the 
content to arrive from the websites to the unit cost of delay per unit of time 
Hu , Lu  The utility function for H-type and L-type consumers respectively 
i  The BSP‟s profit, NN1, NN2, NN3, NNN1, NNN2, NNN3i   
CSi  Consumer surplus, NN1, NN2, NN3, NNN1, NNN2, NNN3i   
SWi  Social Welfare, NN1, NN2, NN3, NNN1, NNN2, NNN3i   
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d
F V


      
  
          
 
 
 
 
 NNN1_2
1
CS 1
1 1
H L
H L
L H L
d
V V
  

      
   
      
      
 
   
 
 NNN1_2
SW 1
11 1
H L
LL H L
d d
V V

 
        
   
                        
 
NNN2 
*
NNN2_H L
H
d
F V
 
 

, 
   
*
NNN2_L
1
L
H H L
d
F V

     
 
     
 
 
 
 
2
* * *
NNN2 NNN2_H NNN2_L
1
1
1
H L
L
H H L
d
F F V
     
  
     
   
      
    
 
 NNN2CS H LV V   
 
   NNN2
SW 1
1
H L
H H H L
d d
V V

 
       
  
                 
 
NNN3 
   
*
NNN3
1
L
H H L
d
F V

     
 
     
 
   
*
NNN3
H H L
1
1 HH
d d
p

       
  
  
       
 
 
 
2
* * *
NNN3 NNN3 H NNN3
1
1
H L
L
H H L
d
F p V
     
 
     
   
     
    
 
 NNN3CS H LV V   
 
   NNN3
SW 1
1
H L
H H H L
d d
V V

 
       
  
                 
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Appendices 
In order to simplify the proofs, we introduce the following notations. 
Define 
   1 1H L H L
d
C

      

          
 
   1L H H L
d
C

     

     
 
 
 0 1
H L
L H L
d
C
 
    


    
 
      
     1
1 1
1 1
L H L H L
H L H L
d
C
        
        
       

           
 
   2 1 1
L
L H L
d
C

      

          
 
 
   3
1
1 1
H L
L H L
d
C
  
      
   
          
 
   4 1 1
H
L H L
d
C

      

          
 
We know that 2 3 4 HC C C C    since  1H H L L          . 
Next we show 1 2C C  as below. 
   
      
     
2 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
L H L H LL
L H L H L H L
dd
C C
        
               
        
  
                         
 
   
      
     
1 11
1 1 1 1
L H L H LL
L H L H L H L
dd          
               
        
 
                        
   
   
1
0
1
H L
H H L
d   
     
 
 
     
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The intersection between 
 
  01
H LH L H L
H
L LL H L
dV V
V C
  
     

   
    
 and 
    41 1
H
H L L
L H L
d
V V V C

      
   
          
 is 
    
     
1
1 1
H L L H L
L
H L L H L
d
V
      
        
     

           
. 
 
The intersection between 
 
  01
H LH L H L
H
L LL H L
dV V
V C
  
     

   
    
 and 
   1 1H HL H L
d
V C

      
 
          
 is 
  
   
1
1 1
H H L L
L H
H L H L
d
V C
    
       
     
          
 
since 
  
   
1
1 1
H H L L
H
H L H L
d
C
    
       
     
          
 
  
       
1
1 1 1 1
H H L L
H L H L L H L
d d     
              
     
                       
 
   
   
1
0
1 1
H L L
H L H L
d   
       
  
 
          
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Appendix A: Solution of Formulation (7) – Option NN3 
In Formulation (7), from (i), we get 
 NN3 NN31H HH L
d
F V p
   
  
  
. From (ii), we 
get 
 NN3 NN31L LH L
d
F V p
   
  
  
. We consider two cases: 
Case 1: 
NN3
H L
H L
V V
p
 



. Then 
   NN3 NN31 1H H L LH L H L
d d
V p V p 
       
    
     
. So constraint (i) is 
binding, i.e., 
 NN3 NN31H HH L
d
F V p
   
  
  
. Substituting into the objective 
function gives 
 
   NN31
1
H H L
H L
d
V p  
   
   
  
. The optimal solution is 
 
*
NN3
1
L H H L
H L H L H L
V V d
F
 
       
   
    
, 
*
NN3
H L
H L
V V
p
 



, and 
 
 
*
NN3 1
1
H L
H L
d
V V  
   
   
  
. 
Case 2: NN3
H L
H L
V V
p
 



. Then 
   NN3 NN31 1L L H HH L H L
d d
V p V p 
       
    
     
. So constraint (ii) is 
binding, i.e., 
 NN3 NN31L LH L
d
F V p
   
  
  
. Substituting into the objective 
function gives 
 
  NN3
1
L H L
H L
d
V p  
   
  
  
. 
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Case 21: 
 1
H L L H
H L H L
V V d 
     


   
. The optimal solution is 
 
*
NN3
1
H L L H
H L H L
V V d
F
 
     

 
   
, 
*
NN3
H L
H L
V V
p
 



, and 
 
 
*
NN3 1
1
H L
H L
d
V V  
   
   
  
. 
Case 22: 
 1
H L L H
H L H L
V V d 
     


   
. The optimal solution is 
*
NN3 0F  , 
 
*
NN3
1
1
L
L H L
d
p V
    
 
  
   
 
(Since 
 1
H L L H
H L H L
V V d 
     


   
, 
 
*
NN3
1 1
1
H L L H H L
L L
L H L L H L H L
V V V Vd
p V V
 
         
    
       
      
.) 
 
 
*
NN3
1
1
H L
L
L H L
d
V
  

    
   
   
     
. 
The above cases can be summarized as: 
Case NN3_1: If 
 1
H L L H
H L H L
V V d 
     


   
, i.e., 
 
  01
H LH L H L
H
L LL H L
dV V
V C
  
     

   
    
, 
 
*
NN3_1
1
H L L H
H L H L
V V d
F
 
     

 
   
, 
*
NN3_1
H L
H L
V V
p
 



, 
 
 
*
NN3_1 1
1
H L
H L
d
V V  
   
   
  
. The corresponding consumer surplus is  
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 
 
 
NN3_1 NN3_1 NN3_1
NN3_1 NN3_1
CS
1
1 0
1
H H
H L
L L
H L
d
V F p
d
V F p
 
   
 
   
 
        
 
          
. 
Therefore the social welfare is 
 
 
*
NN3_1 NN3_1 NN3_1SW CS 1
1
H L
H L
d
V V  
   
     
  
. 
Case NN3_2: If 
 1
H L L H
H L H L
V V d 
     


   
, i.e., 
 
  01
H LH L H L
H
L LL H L
dV V
V C
  
     

   
    
, 
*
NN3_2 0F  , 
 
*
NN3_2
1
1
L
L H L
d
p V
    
 
  
   
, 
 
 
*
NN3_2
1
1
H L
L
L H L
d
V
  

    
   
   
     
. 
The corresponding consumer surplus is  
 
 
 
NN3_2 NN3_2 NN3_2
NN3_2 NN3_2
CS
1
1
1
H H
H L
L L
H L
d
V F p
d
V F p
 
   
 
   
 
        
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
1
1 1
1
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Therefore the social welfare is 
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Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1 
Now we move on proving Proposition 1. Comparing the BSP‟s three options under net neutrality, 
we know 
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Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 2 
Comparing the BSP‟s three options under no net neutrality, we know 
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Then we compare 
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. 
Since 1 3C C , we get if 1H LV V C  , 
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Summarizing the results, we have: if 3H LV V C  , 
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Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 3 
From the results of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, we know: under net neutrality, 
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Under no net neutrality, If 3H LV V C  , then  
* *
NNN NNN1_1
1
L
L
d
V 
  
  
 
; 
If 
1 3L H LV C V V C     ,    
* *
NNN NNN1_2
1 1
H
L H L
d
V

 
      
  
          
; 
If 
1H LV V C  , 
 
   
2
* * *
NNN NNN2 NNN3
1
1
H L
L
H H L
d
V
     
  
     
       
     
. 
Considering the BSP‟s overall preference, there are six cases: 
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Case (ii): If 
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If  
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So 
* *
NN3_2 NNN2  . 
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Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 5 
Comparing social welfare under NNN1, NNN2, and NNN3 gives 
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Therefore NNN1 NNN2 NNN3SW >SW SW . 
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Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 6 
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 49 
Appendix G: Proof of Proposition 7 
From Proposition 6, we know that the social planner always prefers NNN1. From Proposition 3, 
we know that under the following two scenarios: (1) 
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, the BSP prefers NN3 and therefore the 
BSP would deviate from the social planner‟s preferred option. 
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